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ADMINISTRATVE LAW
ERNEST L. Foix, IHl*
I. THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE
A. IiqTRODUCTIOx
Just as the "standing" issue dominated Administrative Law
cases in the last Survey period,' this year the focal point of the
major decisions is the "delegation doctrine." Although the "dele-
gation doctrine" has almost passed out of sight on the federal
level, it is very much alive in most states. Clearly in South Caro-
lina, it plays a major role in judicial control of the administrative
process. Unfortunately, in South Carolina as elsewhere, the con-
cept becomes deeply entangled in a thicket of verbal "tests"
which have no intrinsic meaning and which only serve to obscure
the policy issues at the basis of the doctrine. The abstract terms
in which it is expressed, and the justifications asserted for apply-
ing it, often cause the cases to appear inconsistent and contra-
dictory, even though the results of the decisions are frequently
sound.
The core concept can be simply stated. The legislature, an
elected body responsible directly to the people, makes the laws
within broad limits laid down by the state and federal consti-
tutions. Presumably because of fears of executive power histori-
cally drawn from hatred for royal prerogative, law-making ca-
pacity cannot avowedly be recognized except for the legislative
branch. This only conceals the undeniable fact that courts, execu-
tive officers, administrative agencies, and governmental authori-
ties of all sorts and conditions do make law, and must make law.
When this fact comes to the surface, as it does all the time, we feel
the need to apologize for the conflict of theory and practice, and
we insist upon some device by which the "real" law making body,
the legislature, may "control" other authorities which we re-
luctantly permit to do things suspiciously similar to making law.
It is in the "delegation doctrine" that we try to reconcile prac-
tice and theory, and maintain the supremacy of the legislature's
law making function. As a matter of linguistics, we usually con-
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fine the "delegation" concept to administrative agencies, and
their functions. Thus the "delegation" concept is a device-not
the only possible one, be it noted-to maintain the subordinate
position of the non-elected administrative agencies in the struc-
ture of government, and, in particular, subordination to the
legislature and, within limits, to the courts.
The constitutional basis is particularly clear if we say, as the
courts have often declared,2 that the powers of the legislature
may not be delegated to other bodies.3 It is also evident when
legislative powers are in fact delegated, but the courts require
that the delegated legislative powers be exercised under and in
accordance with "standards" laid down by the legislature. South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Harbin4 equated the "stand-
ards" concept with a requirement that the statute delegating
legislative power must lay down some "intelligible guide"5 or
"intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body
must conform."0 This formulation gives a clear focus to the
main point-recognizing the fact of. delegation but controlling
it-especially when the court observes that "no fixed formula"
is possible for all cases,7 nor are the limits of delegation sus-
ceptible to "precise definition."" Standards can be stated only
"with such degree of certainty as the nature of the case permits." 9
Given this formulation of the delegation concept, nothing is
added by the usual rubrics, e.g., the agency "may not make law"
but may only "fill up the details," °0 the statute must be "coin-
2. "It is elementary that the legislature may not delegate to an administra-
tive agency its power to make laws." Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 264, 125
S.E.2d 621, 623 (1962), appeal dismissed, 9 L. Ed.2d 966 (1963). For similar
statements, see State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 468, 150 S.E.
269, 273 (1929) ; 102d Officers Club v. Heise, 201 S.C. 68, 75, 21 S.E2d 400,
404 (1942) ; Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comnm'n, 240 S.C. 347, 355, 126
S.E.2d 15, 19 (1962).
3. Occasionally, a state constitution will specifically so declare. See MAss.
CoNsT. art. 30 (1780), providing:
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them; The
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either
of them; The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive, or
either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
4. 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 466 (1955).
5. Id. at 593, 86 S.E.2d at 469.
6. Id. at 594, 86 S.E.2d at 470.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 269, 125 S.E.2d 621, 625 (1962) (dissent-
ing opinion) ; South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585,
594, 86 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1955). Cole v. Manning is also noted in the Consti-
tutional law section at note 28, and in the Criminal Law section at note 18.
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plete in itself""' leaving only its "execution' 2 or "enforce-
ment""' to the subordinate body, certain powers are non-dele-
gable because "strictly and exclusively legislative" in character,
14
and so on.
The "delegation doctrine" may serve useful purposes, assum-
ing it is applied in an evenhanded way and without excessive
involvement in abstractions. Certainly it forces the legislature
to consider just what powers it proposes to delegate to an agency,
how it wants those powers exercised, and what objectives the
statute should achieve. Thus, it may be useful to the agency
itself because it indicates the lines along which the agency should
do its own work. At the same time, the presence of standards
enables the court more intelligently to perform its own limited
review functions. It can determine more readily whether the
agency is implementing the legislative intention, since standards
are one device for indicating the statutory purpose. Thus, it
offers an incentive to more thoughtful and careful drafting of
statutes-something often seriously deficient in state statutes.
This is especially true with regard to those establishing adminis-
trative agencies and their regulatory programs.'5 On the other
hand, requiring standards may do little real good. A mere form
of words may be held to satisfy the "delegation doctrine," and
an agency may, in effect, be directed to go out and regulate an
industry "in the public interest" or as "public necessity and con-
venience" may require. The judicial search for standards does
not itself take place in a vacuum, and finding or not finding
standards in a statute may depend on the court's approval or
disapproval of the substantive terms of the statute; for the "dele-
gation doctrine" and the "standards" requirement are notoriously
vague. Finally, under the "delegation doctrine" an administra-
tive program, however long established and with whatever safe-
guards, may be voided. This result may occur in spite of the
11. Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 240 S.C. 347, 355, 126 S.E.2d
15, 19 (1962). Accord, State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S. C. 455, 468,
150 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1929).
12. State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S. C. 455, 468, 150 S.E.2d 269,
273 (1929).
13. 102d Officers Club v. Heise, 201 S.C. 68, 75, 21 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1942);
Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 241 S.C. 347, 355, 126 S.E.2d 15,
20 (1962).
14. State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer,, 152 S.C. 455, 480, 150 S.E. 269, 275
(1929), relying upon Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed.
253 (1825). This seems to be the only instance that the South Carolina court
has relied upon this early and unusual formulation of the delegation doctrine.
15. See Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 CoLUM. L.
Rav. 359, 561 (1947) for the most comprehensive treatment of the subject.
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adequacy of judicial review of agency action, the fairness of the
administrative hearing, and the care and precision with which
the agency formulates its own program.
B. Corm v. MAN-nNG.
Cole v. Manning'8 is the most important delegation decision
since the leading case of South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Harbin.' Conceivably, it represents a substantial relaxation of
judicial control via the "delegation doctrine."
In Cole v. Manning, three individuals were indicted for various
related statutory offenses growing out of their smuggling some
10,000 amphetamine tablets ("pep pills") into the state peni-
tentiary. After conviction on pleas of guilty, they sought habeas
corpus in the state courts. The denial of the writ was subsequent-
ly affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The sta-
tute under which they were convicted made it unlawful for "any
person to furnish any prisoner ... with any matter declared by
the director of the prison system to be contraband,"' 8 and regu-
lations adopted by the Director and posted in the penitentiary
specified "contraband" items, including amphetamine pills.19
This posed the major issue in the case: the validity of the statu-
tory delegation of a power to specify "contraband" matter, and
a criminal conviction for violating the regulation. The four-man
majority sustained the validity of the delegation; one justice
dissented with an opinion.
The majority articulated the usual phrases embodying the
"standards" test to sustain the statute. The application of the
concept was considerably more sophisticated than a tedious search
for statutory language which could be dubbed a "standard" sus-
taining the "delegation." In fact, there was no "standard" in
any literal sense of the word, certainly not in the relevant sec-
tion of the statute which merely bars "contraband." Since the
term "contraband" has no fixed or intrinsic meaning,20 the term
itself afforded no "intelligible principle" to guide the director.
So far as the literal words of the statute are concerned, the direc-
tor could have declared Bibles, Hershey bars and apple pies
to be contraband. The important point is that Cole v. Manning,
16. 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 621 (1962).
17. 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 466 (1955).
18. S.C. CoDE § 55-383 (1962); S.C. CODE § 55-14 (Supp 1961).
19. This fact was stipulated. Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 264, 125 S.E.2d
621, 623, appeal dismissed, 9 L. Ed. 2d 966 (1963).
20. Id. at 271, 125 S.E.2d at 626 (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 16
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unlike Harbin, looked beyond the particular statutory provision
to "the legislative policy as declared in the statute, the objective
to be accomplished, and the nature of the agency's field of oper-
ations." 21 The "legislative purpose" was held to be "the main-
tenance of a modern prison system with humane treatment of
prisoners, attention to their welfare, and assistance toward their
rehabilitation." 22 This seems, at least, an "intelligible principle"
by which to differentiate Hershey bars from "pep pills," and
Bibles from pornography.2
3
The approach adopted by the court is a rather conspicuous de-
parture from the Harbin doctrine, although still well within the
"intelligible principle" concept which is the core of that de-
cision. However, in Harbin, the courtopursued a minute analysis
of the single section seeking but not finding a "standard" to
sustain the Highway Department's driver point system. The
statutory provision immediately involved authorized the depart-
ment to revoke or suspend driver licenses "for cause satisfactory"
to it.24 In isolation this provision undoubtedly "lays down no
intelligible principle to which the Department must conform but
leaves the right to revoke or suspend in its unrestricted and un-
controlled discretion"2 5 thereby making the provision uncon-
stitutional under the "delegation doctrine." Overlooked, how-
ever, were other provisions of the statute authorizing revocation
or suspension of a license for various specified causes, including
a finding that a licensee is "an habitual reckless, negligent or
incompetent driver.126 Clearly, this afforded an adequate guiding
principle for the point system, each item of which certainly had
a clear and close relation to the concept of habitual recklessness,
negligence or incompetence. Under Harbin, seemingly, if more
specific standards were required, the legislature would have to
specify the items of the point system by statutory enactment-
as it, in fact, subsequently did.
2
T
21. Id. at 265, 125 S.E2d at 623.
22. Id. at 267, 125 S.E2d at 624.
23. One could also say, in the language of South Carolina State Highway
Dep't v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 594, 86 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1955) that "no fixed
formula" is possible for making such distinctions, and that the legislature, by
banning "contraband" at defined by the Director, laid down a rule "with such
degree of certainty as the nature of the case permits."
24. S.C. CODE § 46-172 (1952).
25. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 593, 86
S.E2d 466, 469 (1955).
26. S.C. CODE § 46-174 (3) (1952).
27. S.C. CODE § 46-195 to 46-196.12 (1962).
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Against this background, the approach taken by Cole v.
Manning28 is conspicuously different. Had the Harbin case been
decided under Cole v. Manning concepts, presumably the adminis-
tratively established driver point system would have survived
judicial scrutiny under the "delegation doctrine" which would
have been satisfied by reference to other related provisions of the
statute. Indeed, Cole v. Manning goes well beyond in two other
respects. (1) In Harbin, the "intelligible principle" could have
been found in a directly and closely related section of the statute.
In Cole v. Manning the statutory policy of maintaining an ade-
quate, modern, etc., prison system had to be inferred from the
act as a whole or, at least, from a preamble or broadly worded
statement of objectives. 9 (2) Harbin was a civil case-the sus-
pension of a driver's license for five months. Cole v. Manning
sustained a felony conviction with two years imprisonment. The
extent of these departures from Harbin are clearly pointed up in
the dissenting opinion in Cole v. Manning.
It is perhaps worth noting that the majority opinion, al-
though briefly talking the language of "standards," also ration-
alized the result in more conceptual terms. It urged that "the
power delegated to the Director is... not legislative but adminis-
trative," and vested him with the "power, in the exercise of a
reasonable discretion, to make administrative regulations . . .
appropriate to effectuate the legislative purpose."30 Hence, the
court could warn that it stands ready to determine whether a
discretionary administrative power has been exercised in a "ca-
pricious or arbitrary" manner.81 This formulation of judicial
control ties in with the traditional role of courts in making deter-
minations as to alleged abuse of discretion or authority-a well
established and reasonably well understood type of judicial
power, used both in equity cases and in administrative proceed-
ings. This has a distinct advantage over routine reliance on the
"delegation doctrine." Under an "abuse of discretion" formula,
the court can often avoid a constitutional issue, and can also set
aside the action of a tribunal without upsetting the entire ad-
ministrative program, thus, the adverse effect is, or can be, fairly
well confined to the particular case at hand. The "delegation
28. 240 S. C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 621 (1962).
29. See S.C. CODE § 55-291 (1962).
30. 240 S.C. 260, 267, 125 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1962).
31. Id. at 267-68, 125 S.E.2d at 625.
[Vol. 16
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doctrine" is a rather blunt weapon, sometimes destroying an en-
tire administrative program, as in the Harbin case.
No one can predict the future, especially on this point, but
Cole v. Manning may conceivably indicate a trend away from
routine use of the "delegation doctrine," and a greater reliance
upon traditional review functions of the courts. These functions
are very often quite adequate for purposes now somewhat crudely
performed by the "delegation doctrine," and include judicial re-
view of the agency's findings of fact, review of agency determi-
nations of question of law, and, of course, judicial insurance that
the agency has used fair procedure in making its decisions.
C. 1EYwAmD v. SouTH CA ;oLnA TAx Com-I'N
Aspects of the delegation doctrine appeared in two other de-
cisions. Heyward v. Sout Carolina Tax Comm'n3 2 invalidated
a Commission regulation establishing the installment method of
reporting gain on sales of property, and providing, inter alia,
that any unpaid balance on an installment sale "must be reported
on the final return of the deceased taxpayer.133 In 1956, the tax-
payer had sold stock for 40,000 dollars payable 10,000 dollars in
cash on the sale date with the remainder payable in four equal
annual installments of 7,500 dollars. After receiving the down
payment in 1956 and the first installment in 1957, the taxpayer
died. In 1958 and 1959, the executor collected the next two in-
stallments as to which he filed tax returns each year. In 1960,
the Commission assessed an additional tax on the ground that
the profit of the entire transaction should have been reported
in the year of death (1956), as required by the Commission rule.
After paying the assessed tax under protest, the executor sued to
recover the amount. Judgment for the Commission in the trial
court was reversed on appeal. The court held that the install-
ment-basis rule had not been authorized by the state tax statutes,
and that the Commission could not assess additional taxes on the
theory that the tax on all remaining installments matured on
the date of death. The holding was placed on the ground that
the legislature had not in fact delegated to the Tax Commission
the authority to establish the installments basis of income tax-
ation.3 4
32. 210 S.C. 347, 126 S.E2d 15 (1962). This case is also noted in the Con-
stitutional Law section at note 38 and in the Taxation section at note 20.
33. Id. at 354, 126 S.E.2d at 19.
34. The court preliminarily rejected arguments that the Commission was
estopped to collect the additional taxes. Id. at 351-53, 126 S.E2d at 17-18.
1963]
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In Heyward, the "delegation doctrine" appears in a form dif-
ferent from that in Harbin5 and Oole v. Manning.0 In those
cases, it is clear that the legislature had in fact delegated, or
had intended to delegate, to the respective public authorities the
power to make the regulation involved there. In Harbin, the
Highway Commission was instructed to revoke and suspend
driver licenses. In Cole v. Manning, the Director of Prisons was
directed to bar introduction of contraband items into the peni-
tentiary. In Harbin, the delegation failed for lack of adequate
standards, signifying that the legislation was unconstitutional.
In Cole v. Manning, the delegation was sustained, and the legis-
lation effecting it was thus constitutional. In the Heyward
case,37 although the court employs the language of the "dele-
gation doctrine,"38 that concept is not really involved for, so far
as we know from the case, there is no evidence that the legis-
lature directed or expected the Commission to develop an install-
ment tax method. Certainly, the court is correct in holding that
a general grant of rule-making power-to make all needed rules
and regulations incident to enforcing the state tax laws3 9-is
not a sufficient basis for adopting an entirely different method
of income taxation.40 Thus, the case is best interpreted as simply
a holding that the Tax Commission's rule was beyond the ambit
of the authority actually granted by the legislature. It is in this
sense, then, that the court can rightly speak of the Commission's
lack of "legal authority to enact new laws in the nature of regu-
lations to satisfy its own theory as to the enforcement of the
income tax laws of this State.141 Had the legislature sanctioned
an installment basis of tax reporting "under such rules and regu-
lations as the Commission may determine," then a true question
of delegation of legislative authority, in the constitutional sense,
would have been presented.
42
35. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 466
(1955).
36. 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 621 (1962).
37. Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 240 S.C. 347, 126 S.E.2d 15
(1926).
38. Id. at 355-56, 126 S.E.2d at 19-20.
39. S.C. CODE § 65-207 (1962).
40. Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 240 S.C. 347, 355-56, 126
S.E.2d 15, 20 (1962).
41. Id. at 356, 126 S.E.2d at 20.
42. The court specifically noted that it did not pass on the question, obvious-
ly posed by its invalidating the installment basis for income taxation, whether
the taxpayer could be required to report the entire profit of the sale of stock
in the year of sale. Id. at 356, 126 S.E.2d at 20.
[Vol. 16
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D. Crr OF FLOimcNE V. GEORGE
City of Florence v. George43 applied the "delegation doctrine"
to a municipal ordinance which forbade in adsolute terms the
conduct of any parade or procession on the city streets except
with a permit previously obtained from the Chief of Police.
44
No standards or guides to the Chief's determination were stated
in the ordinance, which contained no limitations on his discretion
to grant or deny the permit. A group of Negro students were
convicted under the ordinance for staging a parade without a
permit, but their convictions were reversed on appeal.
The case is significant for several reasons. First, it makes
clear that the "delegation doctrine" applies to municipal ordi-
nances as well as to state statutes, and this case, in fact, squarely
so holds. Second, it makes clear that whenever civil liberties,
such as the constitutional right of peaceable assembly and pro-
test, are involved, the statute or ordinance which would curb
those liberties must clearly and specifically indicate the grounds
for doing so.45 Otherwise, constitutional rights and liberties
could be destroyed by any public authority for any reason or no
reason at all. An earlier decision, City of Darlington v. Stan-
ley,46 did uphold convictions for staging a parade without a per-
mit, under similar circumstances. But the Darlington ordinance
specified that it was designed "for the preservation of the health,
welfare and protection" of the local citizenry, the "preservation
of the peace and dignity" of the citizens, and "to maintain law
and order."47 On the assumption that the ordinance would be
applied constitutionally, the Darlington decision held the stand-
ards stated in the ordinance to be constitutionally sufficient.
The contrast between Florence and Darlington points to a
structural weakness in the "delegation doctrine." The only ap-
parent difference between the two ordinances is that Darlington
43. 241 S.C. 77, 127 S.E.2d 210 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Constitutional Law section at note 15 and in the Criminal Law section at note 22.
44. See Id. at 80, 127 S.E2d at 211 for the text of the Florence ordinance.
45. The Supreme Court of the United States has similarly intimated the same
requirement with respect to federal administrative regulations curbing the right
to travel, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (1958), or limiting
the right of confrontation and cross-examination, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
414, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1960). See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,
273, 95 L. Ed. 267, 271 (1951) and Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322,
2 L. Ed. 2d 302, 311 (1958) for an application of the same idea in striking
down state statutes and municipal ordinances purportedly giving absolute au-
thority to officials to refuse parade permits.
46. 239 S.C. 139, 122 S.E.2d 207 (1961).
47. See Id. at 142, 122 S.E.2d at 208 for the text of the Darlington ordinance.
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recited a few formal phrases ("health, welfare, and protection...
law and order" 48) while Florence contained none at all. Under
an ordinance containing the Darlington phraseology, a Chief of
Police has, for all practical purposes, as much discretion to deny
a parade permit as he does under the Florence ordinance. At
most, it requires only the making of a few findings to the effect
that the proposed parade would make difficult "protection of
the citizens," would interfere with the "preservation of [their]
peace and dignity," and would be detrimental to "law and order."
Especially if such "findings" are bolstered by easily prepared re-
citals of probably trouble, the denial of a permit could be readily
sustained, since the court will be loath to go behind the findings
of fact made by the public official involved. The point is that,
in many instances, the requirement of standards is purely formal
and ritualistic, that they add nothing of substance to the regula-
tory provision, and that they provide no guidance at all to the
exercise of administrative discretion. They may also be mislead-
ing, providing a cloak behind which petty administrators may
act arbitrarily without adequate check. It is the emptiness of
the "standards" concept which has likely caused the federal
courts to abandon it as a device to control administrative power.
Not only has it not been applied to invalidate federal legislation
since the Supreme Court killed the Industrial Recovery Act in
1935, 9 but, it is said, it had not been applied for a hundred years
before that time to invalidate Congressional action."0 However
in the state courts, "the delegation doctrine" continues a lively
existence as a staple of state administrative law.51
E. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the utility of the delegation doctrine is doubtful.
Conceding that clarity is essential to statutes, it is extremely
speculative whether the "delegation doctrine" in general, and the
"standards" requirement in particular, aids at all in achieving
that desirable objective. And even if it does stimulate precision
in statutory drafting, this virtue of certainty is often nullified
by the massive uncertainties which the "delegation doctrine"
itself introduces into the law. Thus, it is impossible in many in-
48. Id. at 142, 122 S.E.2d at 208.
49. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 79 L.
Ed. 1510 (1935).
50. See JAFFE AND NATHANSON, ANImSnATiVE LAw 90-91 (1961).
51. For a full discussion and critique of the numerous state cases, see I
DAvis, ADmINISTRATnm LAW TREATISE § § 2.07-2.15 (1958).
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stances to lay down "standards," and the courts have recognized
this, as the South Carolina court did in the Darlington case,
52
and in Cole v. Manning.53 But it is also impossible to know in
advance when a court will hold that it is "difficult or impractical
to lay down a definite or comprehensive rule. '54 The delegation
doctrine, far from effectively curbing, in an intelligible way, the
discretion of administrative officers, usually has the effect of
vesting the court itself with the widest sort of discretion in up-
holding or striking down statutes on delegation grounds. And
the courts themselves do not, and probably cannot, indicate the
factors which motivate them to apply the "delegation doctrine."
Indeed, the delegation concept is even more nebulous than "due
process" itself. Moreover, it purports to tell the legislature what
it may or may not surrender out of its plenum of legislative
power, although one would suppose that the legislature was itself
the best judge of how and by whom it wished such powers exer-
cised. This is very different from telling the legislature that a
particular substantive enactment offends due process, the classical
function of the courts under the American doctrine of "judicial
review." The "delegation doctrine," unlike due process, is hardly
essential to maintaining liberties, if, indeed, it makes any signifi-
cant contribution in that direction. Of course, a statute may
violate due process under the "void for vagueness" formula; but
here the focus is on justice to the individual who must be suffi-
ciently informed of the offense, whereas the touchstone of the
"delegation doctrine" is a curb upon administrative power. Apart
from the "void for vagueness" limitation, due process may be
done by and under a statute which does not meet the standards
criterion of the "delegation doctrine." Hence, a statute which
is full of "standards" satisfying the most rigid version of the
delegation doctrine may be grossly unjust.
H. PUBLICATION OF RULES
In two short sentences at the close of the majority opinion,
Cole v. Manning55 made an important determination on the notice
requirements for rules and regulations made by a governmental
52. City of Darlington v. Stanley, 239 S.C. 139, 147, 122 S.E.2d 207, 210
(1961).
53. 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 621 (1962).
54. City of Darlington v. Stanley, 239 S.C. 139, 147, 122 S.E.2d 207, 210
(1961).
55. 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E2d 621 (1962).
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authority.56 The list of contraband items, validly determined by
the Director, was posted conspicuously in the state peniten-
tiary;57 but had not been certified and filed with the Secretary
of State under the general rule of publication requirements of
Code Section 1-11. 8 The argument, of course, was that the rule
was unenforceable, especially in a criminal case, when due statu-
tory notice had not been given. The court rejected this, stating
that the later prison statute, specifying the manner of noticing
contraband items, prevailed over the earlier general statute re-
quiring filing with the Secretary of State. 9 In effect, there had
been due notice given under one statute-the prison statute. The
only question, then, was whether the rule was unenforceable be-
cause it had not been given in accordance with the requirements
of another statute.
Cutting through all conceptual arguments, the result of this
holding seems unexceptionable. The whole object of statutes re-
quiring publication of regulations is to give reasonable assurance
to potentially affected persons that they will know the law's
requirements, and can act accordingly. A subsidiary objective
is to collect in some convenient and accessible location all such
rules and regulations. Thus, the Federal Register collects and
publishes federal agency rules, and these are accessible, at least
to those initiated in the mysteries of reading the Federal Regis-
ter. Similarly, the requirement of filing with the Secretary of
State collects outstanding administrative regulations in a single
location, thus serving convenience.60 But if these are two prime
objectives of requiring centralized availability or publication of
rules, they seem to have been served by the Director of Prisons'
posting the rules in the penitentiary. First, there was the nearest
thing to actual notice one could have. The affected individuals-
those who want to bring questionable items into prisons-could
see the rules for themselves in the place where they would most
likely look for them-the prison itself. Posting them there also
served the objectives of convenience in locating and finding out
the rules. It is rather laughable to suppose that persons planning
to smuggle contraband into prison would first go to the Secre-
56. Id. at 268, 125 S.E2d at 625. The dissenting opinion did not take up
this issue.
57. This fact vas stipulated. Id. at 264, 125 S.E.2d at 623.
58. S.C. Cons § 1-11 (1962).
59. Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 268, 125 S.E.2d 621, 625, appeal dis-
snissed 9 L. Ed. 2d 966 (1963).
60. See Davis v. Query, 209 S.C. 41, 49, 39 S.E.2d 117, 121-22 (1916) for
a statement of the purposes of the publication requirement.
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tary of State's office to check into the permissible items which
can go into a prison.
A recent federal decision is comparable. In United States v.
Aarons,61 a group of pacifists sailed into forbidden waters where
a nuclear submarine was to be launched. The Coast Guard had
designated the restricted area, but it had not published the rule
in the Federal Register, as required by federal law. As the
pacifists approached the area, a Coast Guard vessel halted their
boat and handed them the text of the rule and ordered them to
go no further. They disobeyed, and were arrested and convicted,
and the conviction was sustained. The key point here was that
the pacifists had actual notice of the rule, and were able to
judge whether they wished to adhere to or violate it.
Cole v. Manning62 goes, perhaps, a step beyond. So far as the
case shows from its recital of facts, the defendants did not have
actual notice of the rule.63 That is, the court does not indicate
any testimony to the effect that these men actually read on the
bulletin board that amphetamine tablets are contraband. Never-
theless, people do not normally smuggle 10,000 amphetamine
tablets into a state penitentiary wholly unconscious of the prob-
able legal consequences. However, it is desirable that an ex-
ception to a statutory requirement of publishing rules should be
narrowly restricted to instances of proven actual knowledge.
Even then, actual knowledge of the unpublished rule may be an
insufficient ground for an exception in a particular case. For
example, an attorney may advise a client that projected action
is lawful, since the attorney has checked out all possibly relevant
statutes, decisions, and rules and regulations. If, at the last
moment, before the client embarks on the course of action, he is
confronted with an unpublished rule, he may be placed in an
extremely awkward position of judging (1) whether to jettison
his plans made on the basis of competent legal advise, taking
all known and knowable rules into account, or (2) to go through
with his plans and risk the consequence that a court will later
hold that he has acted unlawfully. Thus, even an actual notice
exception to a rules publication requirement may generate un-
certainty as to a permissible course of conduct and render es-
pecially difficult the rule of the lawyer in giving advice. Hence,
at the most, the sole exception should be actual knowledge of a
61. 310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962).
62. 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 621 (1962).
63. There has been no opportunity to check the transcript of record in the
case to determine this point.
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rule, actually imparted to the persons affected, under circum-
stances which work no unfairness to them, taking into account
that needless uncertainty and confusion of plans may work un-
fairness. To extend the exception beyond this narrow limitation
is to undo the beneficient effects of mandatory rules publication.
This consequence would be especially unfortunate, since existing
federal and state statutes requiring publication of administrative
requlations do not begin to provide a satisfactory method for
easily and quickly locating current administrative rules and
regulations. 4
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. REVIEW OF FACTS
As usual, a group of Workmen's Compensation cases reiterated
the settled standard for reviewing fact findings under that
statute. Thus, in Gosnell v. Bryant,65 the issue was the existence
of "any competent evidence to support the findings of fact by
the [industrial] Commission that there was no causal connection
between the employee's injury ... and his asserted disability."
Otherwise stated, the court's inquiry is "whether there is any
evidence reasonably tending to support" the conclusion. 6  The
corollary of the rule is rejection of an award based upon "sur-
mise, conjecture, or speculation." 67 In Gosnell, the commission's
finding of no causal connection was upheld by the court. The
same test was applied in Lee v. Wentworth Mfg. Co., 8 to sustain
an award, where the operative question was whether, under the
facts, the injury arose out of and in the course of the claimant's
employment. The "any competent evidence" test was also stated
and applied in Jake v. Jones, 9 Brittle v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc.,70 and Grice v. Dickerson, Inc.7 1
64. See Futor, Searching the Federal Regulations: Forty-Seven Steps Are
Too Many, 45 A.B.A.J. 43 (1959).
65. 240 S.C. 215, 125 S.E.2d 405 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Workmen's compensation section at note 2.
66. Id. at 217, 125 S.E.2d at 405.
67. Id. at 218, 125 S.E.2d at 406.
68. 240 S.C. 165, 125 S.E.2d 7 (1962). This case is also noted in the Work-
men's compensation section at note 7.
69. 240 S.C. 574, 579, 126 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1962). This case is also noted
in the Workmen's compensation section at note 8.
70. 241 S.C. 255, 257, 127 S.E.2d 884, 885 (1962). This case is also noted
in the Workmen's compensation section at note 8.
71. 241 S.C. 225, 227, 127 S.E.2d 722, 724 (1962). In this case, the court
also stated that "circumstantial evidence" may support an award or fact finding,
if "the facts and circumstances proved give rise to a reasonable inference that
there was a causal connection between claimant's present disability and his prior
injury and surgical operation." Id. at 229, 127 S.E2d at 724. This case is also
noted in the Workmen's compensation section at note 1.
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In Randolph v. Fiske-Carter Constr. Co.)7 2 an award was sus-
tained per curiam. Although the reported order of the trial
court used variant language to express the test of review of
facts--"whether there is any testimony whatsoever in the record
to support the findings of fact by the Commission" 2'3-it cannot
be read as stating a different standard from the "any competent
evidence rule,"74 since the court itself impliedly equated the two
statements.76 In all events, whatever the precise wording, the
test seems in practice equivalent to the long established federal
test of "substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole,"76 although the South Carolina courts seemingly have not
encountered the subtleties which the Supreme Court of the United
States articulated in the leading decision of NLRB v. UniversaZ
Camera Co.77 After all, it seems inherent in any test for review-
ing administrative fact findings that the court examine the
entire record-both favorable and unfavorable evidence-to de-
termine whether the agency fact findings are adequately sup-
ported by evidence.78 There is often a very thin line between a
court's examining the record under such a test and weighing the
evidence to make its own fact findings. But the job is possible,
given the correct judicial attitude which is or should be one of
reluctance to invade the administrative preserve. It seems per-
fectly clear from the South Carolina decisions that the court
grasps that fine distinction, even if, unlike the federal courts, it
has never had to articulate this evanescent distinction into words.
So far as words can reflect the proper performance of the review
function, the South Carolina decisions do so when they stress, as
Gosnell does, that "it is the exclusive function of the Industrial
Commission to settle questions of fact," and that there is a neces-
sary "limit of the inquiry which the Circuit Court and this Court
is permitted to make" under the "any competent evidence" stand-
ard.79 Although the court "recognize [s] that the evidence in the
72. 240 S.C. 182, 125 S.E.2d 267 (1962).
73. Id. at 185, 125 S.E.2d at 268.
74. See Folk, Administrative Law, 15 S.C.L. Rav. 2, 28 (1962).
75. Randolph v. Fiske-Carter Constr. Co., 240 S.C. 182, 189, 125 S.E.2d 267,
270 (1962). This case is also noted in the Workmen's compensation section at
note 3.
76. This is the test in the Administrative Procedure Act § 10 (e), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009 (e) (1958).
77. 340 U.S. 474, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951).
78. See Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record:"
64 HAnv. L. Rav. 1233, 1234 (1951); Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Ad-
ministrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 1026, 1049-50 (1941).
79. Gosnell v. Bryant, 240 S.C. 215, 218, 125 S.E.2d 405, 406 (1962).
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case is undoubtedly scant and gives rise to other inferences in-
consistent with the [facts recited in the opinion], [i]t is not our
duty.., to weigh the testimony, but only to determine whether
the record contains evidence reasonably tending to support the
conclusions of the" commission.80 It is a delicate task the courts
must perform-as many outside of the field or administrative
law and related subjects do not realize-and it is fair to say that
the South Carolina courts have done this phase of the judicial
job in admirable fashion.8'
In Workmen's Compensation cases, South Carolina continues
to adhere to the doctrine of jurisdictional fact. The most recent
application of this established local rule is Allen v. Phinney Oil
Co.82 Whether or not the claimant is or is not an employee is a
jurisdictional fact and the Industrial Commission's findings ac-
cordingly are "not conclusive on appeal." Hence, both the trial
and appellate courts "have the power and duty to review the
record and decide the jurisdictional question in accord with the
preponderance of the evidence." s8  The case reinstated the com-
mission's determination of its own lack of jurisdiction of the
claim.
B. THn REQUIREMNET oF FiNNGms
An important decision by the South Carolina court, Drake v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., s 4 emphasizes the necessity of full and
adequate findings by an administrative agency as a predicate for
judicial review. There, the Industrial Commission awarded com-
pensation for total and permanent disability growing out of an
allegedly work-connected pulmonary disease known as asbestosis.
The disease was diagnosed in 1958, four years after the employee
had been discharged in 1954. Interpreting the applicable statutes
80. Grice v. Dickerson, Inc., 241 S.C. 225, 231, 127 S.E.2d 722, 725 (1962).
Of course, under the Workmen's Compensation statute, the evidence must be
reviewed in the light most favorable to the claimant. Ibid.
81. This sense of the judicial function on reviewing evidentiary findings is
especially evident in the factually close case of Jake v. Jones, 240 S.C. 574, 126
S.E.2d 721 (1962). Although the decedent's nude body was found in water, and
his clothes scattered about, suggesting that he suddenly decided to go swimming,
the court sustained the Commission's finding that the death occurred in the
course of employment. "It is reasonable to infer from the evidence that cir-
cumstances arose in connection with his work, which the deceased thought re-
quired his entering the water and, having done so, was drowned.", Id. at 581,
126 S.E.2d at 724.
82. 241 S.C. 173, 127 S.E.2d 448 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Workmen's Compensation section at note 5.
83. Id. at 176. 127 S.E.2d at 450.
84. 241 S.C. 116, 127 S.E.2d 288 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Workmen's Compensation section at note 12.
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of limitations, 5 and- the requirement that compensability of a
pulmorary disease depends upon the claimant's exposure to it
for at least a year of his employment,8 6 the court insisted upon a
"definite finding as to the time when the [claimant's] total dis-
ability began and as to the time when she by reasonable diligence
should have discovered that her condition was a compensable
one."8 7 Since the findings actually made by the commission did
not meet this test, the court remanded the case to the commission
to make the necessary findings of fact.
The court's decision is clearly sound. The absence of the
necessary findings makes it impossible for the reviewing tribunal
to determine precisely what the facts are, or whether the com-
mission has correctly, interpreted the statute. The court also
rejected a contention that when the commission made the award
effective from 1954, when her employment terminated, there
was an implied finding that disability began as of that date.88
Although the court has on occasion implied findings of fact in
Workmen's Compensation cases,89 these decisions were distin-
guished as involving only the peripheral issue of assessing costs
for an employer's unreasonably defending a compensation claim
and not "the basic questions of liability for compensation." 90
Because the latter questions are so intertwined with the often
conflicting evidence, the agency must squarely rule upon the is-
sue, for otherwise the court is being forced to make what are
essentially fact findings. This is, of course, contrary to the basic
premises of judicial review of administrative action, and quite
correctly the court rejects any invitation to assume the duties
of the agency.
C. R vmw oF ADmNIST TIVE DYIERmINATIONS OF POLICY ORT LAW
Stephenson Fin. Co. v. South Carolina Tax omm'n,91 dis-
cussed elsewhere for its substantive points 92 commented briefly
85. S.C. Code §§ 72-301 (claimant must give notice within 30 days after
accident unless there is a satisfactory excuse and the employer is not prejudiced
by delay), 72-303 (complete bar to compensation after one year from accident).
86. S.C. CODE § 72-255 (1962).
87. Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 241 S.C. 116, 127, 127 S.E.2d 288,
294 (1962).
88. Id. at 127-28, 127 S.E.2d at 294-95.
89. Cole v. State Highway Dep't, 190 S.C. 142, 2 S.E.2d 490 (1939);
Dameron v. Spartan Mills, Inc., 211 S.C. 217, 44 S.E.2d 465 (1947).
90. Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 241 S.C. 116, 128, 127 S.E.2d 288,
295 (1962).
91. 242 S.C. 98, 130 S.E.2d 72 (1963). This case is also noted in the Cor-
poration section at note 13 and in the Taxation section at note 40.
92. See note 13 in the Corporation section.
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on the status of administrative determinations of policy or con-
struction of statutes. Here the Tax Commission assessed addi-
tional taxes on a transaction combining several corporations by
way of an exchange of shares. The substantive issue was whether
this was, within the meaning of the statute,93 a tax-exempt "re-
organization, consolidation or merger." The Tax Commission
thought that it was not exempted, and the Supreme Court agreed.
Although the court made its own independent reading of the
statute, it noted that the Tax Commission's reading of the statute
is "entitled to most respectful consideration and should not be
overruled without good reasons.""' Precisely what are "good
reasons" dispensing with any duty of "respectful consideration"
cannot be determined in advance. However, it is doubtful wheth-
er the court would ever take the position, once espoused in
the federal law, of giving nearly conclusive weight to an adminis-
trative policy determination or statutory reading.9 5 It seems
proper that it need not, indeed should not, do so. Here it seems
perfectly reasonable for the court to make its own independent
reading of the statute, although it would have discretion, had it
wished to do so, to affirm the Tax Commission on the ground
that its reading of a since superseded statute was reasonable and
would be sustained. Presumably, the court was reluctant to
take this sort of position in reversing a trial court, and this, too,
seems a perfectly permissible consideration. In short, the signifi-
cant point is that it is a matter of the reviewing court's dis-
cretion not to be curbed by rigid rules, to decide the statutory
issue itself, or simply to uphold the administrative construction
of the statute on grounds such as "reasonableness."
D. EXHAUSTION OF AD3nNISTRATIVE REMEDIES AN]) Pm -fTOT
"Exhaustion" and "pre-emption" are related, though not identi-
cal, concepts, when applied to a case which may involve an ad-
ministrative agency. Both raise the question whether, and when,
a court may step into a case which an agency also may consider.
The exhaustion concept, roughly stated, is that the court will not
consider the matter until the available administrative remedies
93. S.C. CoDE § 65-275 (1952). The revised provision appears as S.C. CODE
§ 65-275 (1962).
94. Stephenson Fin. Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 242 S.C. 98, 103,
130 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1963).
95. This is the so-called rule of Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 86 L. Ed. 301
(1941). However, this doctrine was applied in Lee v. DeBerry, 219 S.C. 382,
393, 65 S.E.2d 775, 780 (1951).
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have been resorted to, e.g., no judicial review of an interlocutory
administrative order. True, the court has jurisdiction of the
subject matter;96 but for good reasons-perhaps statements in
the statute or simply good judicial administration-it defers
exercising that jurisdiction until the administrative tribunals and
remedies have been run through.97 In "pre-emption," it is as-
sumed that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter,
and never will obtain it even when the litigant has exhausted
all administrative remedies. The concept is especially prominent
in cases involving state and federal relations and notably in the
exclusion of much state court jurisdiction by the National Labor
Relations Act and the Labor Board which administers that
statute.
Two South Carolina cases point out this distinction, both of
them raising labor law questions in a general sense. In Iva Mfg.
Co. v. InternationaZ Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, LocaZ 0598
an employer sought and obtained from the lower court an in-
junction against a union picketing his plant. The Supreme
Court reversed, noting that the jurisdiction of the state courts
had been pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act. The
test of pre-emption now appears to be whether the union ac-
tivities "arguably" are protected by the relevant sections of the
national statute,99 and the South Carolina Supreme Court ap-
plied that test in striking the injunction "for lack of juris-
diction." 00 Whatever may be the merits of the substantive labor
law issue, it is clear that the court rightly found a total pre-
emption of state court jurisdiction. Presumably, state court
jurisdiction exists with certainty only if the Labor Board has
definitely determined that the conduct of the union is not pro-
tected by national law. Certainly, no lesser standard could safely
be applied in picking out the contours of state court jurisdiction
in this area, apart from violence, intimidation, duress, etc.
96. See Betterson v. Stewart, 238 S.C. 574, 121 S.E2d 102 (1961) which
incorrectly viewed non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as depriving courts
of jurisdiction of the subject matter. See also Folk, Administrative Law, 15
S.C.L.REv. 2, 26-27 (1962).
97. For a good judicial statement of this issue, see United States v. Western
Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 1 L. Ed. 2d 126, 131-132 (1956).
98. 241 S.C. 566, 129 S.E.2d 521 (1963).
99. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 3 L. Ed.2d
775 (1959).
100. Iva Mfg. Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Local 25,
241 S.C. 566, 549, 129 S.E2d 521, 523 (1962).
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Martin v. Southern Ry. 0o.101 presented an exhaustion issue,
but held that, under the circumstances, the usual exhaustion doc-
trine is inapplicable. Here a railroad conductor was discharged
for drinldng on the job, after notice and hearing on his miscon-
duct under the railroad's operating rules. Under the Railway
Labor Act, the conductor could have pursued the matter with the
National Railway Adjustment Board, but instead of doing so he
sued in the state courts for damage for wrongful discharge in
breach of contract. The issue was whether he could maintain
the state court action, and, in particular, whether the facts of
his discharge could be considered by the jury which he had re-
quested. The court held that the conductor's election not to go
to the NRAB was permissible, since, under the Railway Labor
Act, such administrative proceedings need not be exhausted be-
fore going to court. Otherwise stated, there are two remedies:
one judicial, the other administrative. Since he is entitled to a
court trial of his breach-of-contract suit, he may also take the
issue of cause to the jury. On this point, the employer's finding
of misconduct is not conclusive, and probably of little weight.
Thus, despite the availability of a federal administrative pro-
ceeding and a state court remedy, there is no exhaustion require-
ment,, let alone federal pre-emption., Needless to say, the differ-
ence between this situation and the Labor Board pre-emption is a
function of the statutory language and the policy embodied in
these quite different laws.
IV. LICENSES; MANDAMUS
Mocoy v. McAninoh10 2 applied the traditional mandamus
standard of a "clear legal duty" to deny the requested relief.
Here a podiatrist (chiropodist) had "been licensed in 1936 but
lost it in 1942 when the then Board of Chiropody Examiners
revoked it because of the individual's "conviction for fraud prac-
ticed upon a patient" and "other alleged unethical acts." 103 After
many years outside South Carolina engaged in other business,
petitioner returned to the state and in November 1960, requested
the successor Board of Podiatry Examiners to reinstate his
license. His petition was apparently denied, and he sought man-
damus to compel the board to take favorable action. Reversing
101. 240 S.C. 460, 126 S.E.2d 365 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Agency section at note 9.
102. 241 S.C. 211, 127 S.E.2d 620 (1962).
103. Id. at 213, 127 S.E.2d at 621.
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the lower court, the Supreme Court held that "no clear legal
duty" rested on the board to renew or reissue the license. The
result is complicated by the fact that the 1942 revocation was
made without notice or hearing on the charges of fraud and un-
ethical conduct. Even so, the court held that he must apply for
a new license and satisfy the board of his competence, 0 4 since
his prior status, although wrongfully terminated, gave him no
constitutional right to reinstatement, and no "grandfather clause"
in the statute, enacted during his 17 year absence from the
state,10 5 exempted him from applying from a new license.
The case presents some tantalizing questions. Needless to say,
the failure to hold a proper hearing before revoking a man's
license is a grievous deficiency in administrative procedure. The
question is the proper remedy for the wrong done. It would be
one thing to compel reissuance of the license after, say, a year or
so from the invalid revocation; but it is quite another matter to
force automatic reissuance of the license after 18 years during
which he engaged in other business. Even in 1942, he could not
have compelled reissuance of the license had he promptly at-
tacked the revocation in a court action, as he had a right to do.
The'most the court could do would be to set aside the revocation
and remand the case for redetermination after a fair hearing.
Had this hearing resulted in revocation of the license, there
would have been no ground to contest the administrative action,
assuming that the hearing was fair and the evidence sustained
the result under a proper interpretation of the statute. If it
:would have been improper to compel reissuance of the license in
1942, certainly such action would be wrong 18 or more years
later. Not only would mandatory reissuance overcompensate
the original wrong, but it would compel the board to certify
without inquiry an individual who had been out of the field for
many years, engaged in other business. Hence the public interest
is well served by the result of the decision which requires the
board to consider the 1960 application in the light of the events
leading to the 1942 revocation and of subsequent happenings.
With the constitutional and statutory questions out of the way,
104. He was deemed to be a "person desiring to enter upon the practice of
podiatry" under S.C. CODE § 56-305 (1962).
105. In 1960, the statutes governing the practice of podiatry were changed.
Among the revisions was the change in name of the "profession" from "chiro-
pody" to "podiatry," and accordingly the substitution of the Board of Podiatry
Examiners for the predecessor Board of Chiropody Examiners. Certain exemp-
tions for persons already practicing were granted, but none which would cover
the case.
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this question seems one on which the board properly has a good
deal of discretion in making its determination.
V. CONCLUSION
The decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court during
the 1962-1963 and prior survey periods reveal the growing im-
portance of state administrative law. Although the state agencies
are neither so numerous nor powerful as those of the federal
government, in every state there is a steady and seemingly ir-
reversible trend towards increased governmental activity and
the use of administrative agencies as a regulatory medium. It is
easy to overlook the number of agencies established over the
years even in South Carolina, but any acquaintance with legis-
lative enactments and court cases reveals, even to a casual ob-
server, the growing importance of the administrative process on
the state level.
The South Carolina Supreme Court decisions reveal, on a
whole, a firm grasp of the difficult and complex problems posed
by the administrative process, although one may contest individ-
ual holdings or the reasoning of decisions. During the past year,
the rulings on the "delegation doctrine" seem to have placed
that concept in proper focus; and the court's appreciation of its
necessarily limited role in judicial review is especially important.
With this due sense of the relationship of court and agency, it
is possible for two important branches of government to work
harmoniously together towards fulfilling objectives, determined
by the legislature within the limitations of the federal and state
constitutions.
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